Can one still write poems after Auschwitz?

It is in these terms that Theodor W. Adorno (1903-1969) wonders what philosophy in modernity can mean. This question deserves to be put, because it is true that there is a certain vanity of the speeches at certain times of the existence.
Vis-a-vis from death, one keep silent oneself. One collects oneself.
Vis-a-vis with the evil, Voltaire shows, inCandide (1759), which one would well sometimes also make keep silent and not find a reason for all, under penalty of being ridiculous.
Moreover, if philosophy does not manage to change the heart of the man, for what is used it?
And if people more cultivated Europe, which saw being born Goethe (1749-1832), Beethoven (1770-1827) andKant (1724-1804),
could produce crematoriums, which direction to give to the philosophy which wanted to be the heart of this culture?
Isn't it a Utopia vis-a-vis with the darkness of the human nature, and its impotence it with the measurement of our illusions is not relating to it?

Lastly, when well even it a relevance, it completed with modernity is not would have?
When one sees a company starting to think that the thought is not used for nothing and to be useful itself of the culture against the spirit, this is not Heidegger (1889-1976) which is right to say that philosophy was completed withAristote (384-322 av.J.-C.) and what it will take place never again?

It is necessary to philosophize

These questions, one can answer three things.

Firstly, it is necessary to write poems after Auschwitz.
Because Auschwitz was born from a hatred of the culture on behalf of those which said, as one lent to Goebbels,
Minister for Information and Propaganda Nazi:
"When I hear the word culture I leave my revolver"

It is not the first time that humanity is tried by cruelty, and the future remains still dubious today. As is essential it to fight by recalling as the spirit is the work of each day.
Between the perverse rationalization of the evil and silence, there is courage.
When one wants to destroy the spirit, reason moreover to show spirit and to put itself at the school of this one.

Secondly, vis-a-vis with the evil, philosophy is far from being an illusion.
If it is important not to be naive, are wary of despair.
Through saying that the man was, is and will be always bad, one starts by making evil a fate while resigning; then one becomes cynical by saying that the evil is normal, before concluding that only a dictatorship can direct the men.
This is why, in Hobbes (1588-1679) which declares that the man is bad by nature, Rousseau (1712-1778) tries to say, without that being understood, that it is not it.
From where its fiction of the good savage. One cannot reproach philosophy for not changing the man, when, in addition, one makes him objection do it. One cannot either want to do without philosophy and to then show it not to have known to avoid the worst when it arrives.

Thirdly, it is dangerous to say, like Heidegger, that modernity prohibits philosophy.
For which wants, wisdom is there, and if it is given up, it, never releases. Even in modernity!